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ABSTRACT
Over the past 15 years the reliance on computer software, especially
within critical weapons systems, has grown in orders of magnitude. Govern-
ment reports during this same period, however, consistently cite the poor suc-
cess rate experienced by the Department of Defense in contracting for the
development of specialized software as an area of great concern. This thesis
investigates the guidance provided by the Department of the Navy, and the
contractual methods available, to program managers and contracting officers
regarding the procurement of custom designed software. The research con-
ducted concludes that the majority of the blame for software procurement
problems should fall upon the personnel within the acquisition system. The
problem is a problem of "attitude" concerning software development.
Although the system is admittedly cumbersome, the underlying causes result-
ing in cost overruns, schedule delays, and poor performance are not with the
mechanics of the procurement system. Program managers and contracting
officers currently have the tools available within the acquisition system to
improve their ability to contract for the development of custom designed
software.
ACOeSSiOfl lor
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Over the past 15 years the reliance on software, especially within critical
weapons systems has grown in orders of magnitude. Congressional and other
governmental reports during this same period, however, consistently cite the
lack of success of the Department of Defense in contracting for the develop-
ment of specialized software. Unfortunately, the flexibility offered by using
software as an integral part of a weapon is often stifled by the acquisition
system used to procure iL. The Department of Defense's ability to contract for
the development of this mission critical software directly affects the future
defense posture of our Nation.
B. AREA OF RESEARCH AND OBJECTIVE
This th,-Os examincw the "ontractirng and management guidance cur-
rently in place regarding the procurement of custom developed software
within the Department of the Navy. The object of this research is to explore
optioi-s available to program managers and c"nrpeting officers that may
improve the success of acquisition of embedded software.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Question
What currently allowable contractual mechanisms can be used to
improve the Department of the Navy's success in the procurement of custom
developed software ?
2. Subsidiary Questions
a. How successful is the Department of Defense/Department of
the Navy in the procurement of custom software?
b. What directives regulate andior guidc Program Managers and
Contracting Officers in the procurement of custom software ?
c. What contract types are typically used for programs involving
the development of custom software ?
d. Are there any contractual mechanisms that can be used to aid
in the development of custom software ?
D. SCOPE
This thesis investigates the contractual mechanisms and strategies cur-
rently allowed by acquisition laws and regulations that may assist program
managers and contracting officers in the procurement of mission critical soft-
ware for weapon systems. The term "mission critical software for weapons
systems" refers to embedded computer programs whose failure to perform
properly may result in loss of the weapon system, loss of a human being, loss
of mission capability, or severe personal injury. Mission critical software
excludes all administrative type computer programs.
Although the laws and regulations apply across the bard for all Federal
agencies, this thesis, in most cases, deals within the confines of the Depart-
ment of the Navy. It focuses on contractual types, tools, mechanisms and
strategies that have been used in the past during software development pro-
grams. The results of this research are directed towards Department of the
Navy program managers and contracting officers. For the purposes of this
research, the success of a program is based on the Department of the Navy's
shility to deliver a quality weapon system to the fleet, that is-mission
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capable, on time, on budget. Simplifying it one step further by taking a "user-
based" approach to quality, success is measured by how a product satisfies
the user's needs [Ref. 1] .
This thesis takes a strict managerial view of software development. It
does not address specific technical issues. It is the program manager and con-
tracting officer who must bridge the gap between the "ones and zeros"
programmers and the end user. With that in mind, this thesis expiores the
tools available to accomplish such a critical task.
E. METHODOLOGY
1. Literature Search
A literature search wa crondt ,1 in order to validate the basic
premise of the thesis, that in fact ther- ,s a problem regarding the procure-
ment of custom developed software -he Department of Defense. Sources of
this literature -- view were Genera Accounting Office audit reports and the
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange. Extensive use was made of
the Naval Postgraduate School Library, a university library and information
center featuring an on-line bibliographic search capability. A review of both
government and non-government publications and periodicals was conducted.
2. Survey
A written questionnaire was sent to 150 government and industry
professionals with various backgrounds including program management, sys-
tem engineering, contracting and contract administration, test and evalua-
tion, and quality assurance. A copy of the questionnaire used during the
survey is contained in Appendix A. The results of this data collection effort
are contained in Chapter V and Appendix B.
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3. Interview
Personal and telephone interviews were conducted with ,,overn-
ment and non-government personnel with varying background experiences.
Although the number of interviews conducted was small, an attempt was
made to interview a broad spectrum of people involved in the software ievel-
opment process. The areas of expertise of those persons interviewed rnged
from corporate vice-president, to contracting officer, to software quality
assurance representative, to independent validation and verification person-
nel. The intent of the interviews was to supplement and amplify that cata
collected through the survey. A list of the people interviewed is containec in
Appendix C.
F. LIMITATIONS
Although 65 of the 150 questionnaires distributed were returned
(a response rat, of 43%) only 49 had had experience in software development
and acquisition. First hand information regarding specific weapon system
programs was difficult to obtain. Most of the data concerning the problems
encountered during the procurement of embedded mission critical software
were obtained through second sources, such as DoD and General Accounting
Office (GAO) reports. Reliance on these types of reports, in lieu of data
directly from the program offices, may sometimes lead to generalizations of
the entire weapon system program based on problem areas in software devel-
opment. Observations made during this research effort concentrated solely on
the software development within a weapon system. A sincere attempt was




Chapter II establishes the background for the problem. Based on a liter-
ature review, it discusses the criticality of software development and the
government's ability to effectively and efficiently procure that software. The
chapter also outlines the Federal laws and regulations regarding software
development. Additionally, it contains a brief overview of Department of the
Navy's guidance to program managers and contracting officers concerning the
acquisition of custom designed software.
Chapter III contains a description of the contract types outline in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The program manager and contracting
officer must decide which contract type best suits their particular needs. Any
of the contract types outlined in this chapter may be deemed suitable for the
procurement of custom designed software.
Chapter IV provides an overview of the two methodologies used in soft-
ware development. The two schools of thought can be summarized into two
development philosophies: Design to a firm spec, and the use of rapid
prototyping.
Chapter V is a collection of data gathered from the research survey and
from personal interviews. It describes the feelings of "the duty experts from
the field" with respect to contracting for software development.
Chapter VI draws conclusions from the data gathered and makes
recommendations for increasing the success rate of programs involving the
development of mission critical software. The chapter concludes with recom-




There is virtually no modern convenience today that does not require
some piece of software to be functional. From an automatic coffee maker, to a
microwave oven, to an automobile, our reliance on software has become phe-
nomenal. Likewise, in order to combat the sophisticated threat, weapons sys-
tems have become dependent on software for their mission accomplishment.
In February 1979, the Comptroller General of the United States (GAO)
submitted a report to Congress titled, "Contracting For Computer Software
Development - Serious Problems Require Management Attention To Avoid
Wasting Additional Millions" [Ref. 2]. The report cited contractual and man-
agerial problems from the pre-award phase of the acquisition through con-
tract execution that led to cost overruns, lengthy delays and failure, to
deliver a usable product. The GAO investigated nine software developmt t
programs in detail. Eight of the nine programs were classified as "failures
Only one of the nine programs investigated produced software that was
capable of being used as delivered. The major contractual problems cited in
the report are listed below:
(1) Federal agencies contract for software development with little
specific guidance.
(2) Agencies also overestimate the stage of system development they
have reached before they contract.
(3) The lack of a good contractual description of what the contractor is
to do makes it difficult for the agency to claim poor contractor
performance.
6
(4) Agencies quickly over commit themselves and fail to control con-
tractors through strict phasing.
(5) Agencies do not manage software development contracts during
execution.
(6) Agencies accept and pay for software without adequately inspecting
and testing.
(7) Agencies fail to establish a single focal point for communication
with contractors.
(8) Agencies do not adequately specify or enforce contract clauses for
recovery in the event of poor performance.
In 1989, a staff study entitled, "Bugs In The Program, Problems In Fed-
eral Government Computer Software Development And Regulation" [Ref. 3],
was submitted by the Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight to the
Committee on Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.
The study cited that,
Getting value for the Government's money is a recurring problem.
Computer c ftware, which is now a major cost item in many pro-
curements, is not immune from traditional procurement problems such
as delay, cost overruns and poor performance... Worse, the procure-
ment system as presently structured does not take into account the
special needs of computer software systems and can compromise
effective software development from the start.
The report further states that:
... software cannot be properly developed using the welter of regulations
presently in force. While software now drives system requirements, the
procurement system still focuses attention on hardware...
Today's weapon systems have grown tremendously more complex. Their
reliance on embedded software has increased in orders of magnitude. Exam-
ples of this reliance on software are shown in Table I [Ref. 4], comparing an
early 60's weapon system with those of tomorrow. Tables II and III [Ref. 5]
illustrate the cost trends and the increase in the Department of Defense's
7
TABLE I. Weapon Systems Software Complexity Comparison





ATF 5 - 7 million
SDI 25 million (estimate)
* Lines of code are often used to describe the complexity of a software program.
It should also be noted that a doubling of the lines of code does not necessarily
equate to a doubling of complexity, and more likely results in a program 10
times more complex.
Source: Kitfield, James. "Is Software DoD's Achilles' Heel?" Military Forum
TABLE II. Cost Trends: Hardware Versus Software
(percentage of total costs)
1955 197 197 1985 (estiate)
COMPUTER HARDWARE 83 45 25 10
SOFTWARE 7 55 75 90
Source: Glaseman, Steven. Comparative Studies in Software Acquisition
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TABLE III. Software Investment by DOD (billions of dollars)
1979
TOTAL DOD SOFTWARE 7 12
EMBEDDED SOFTWARE 5.25 10+
Source: Glaseman, Steven. Comparative Studies in Software Acquisition
expenditures on software, respectively, further amplifying this growing
reliance on software within our major weapons systems. DOD investment in
mission critical software is predicted to be $30 billion in 1990 [Ref. 6]. As this
dependence on software increased, industry has responded by dedicating
more of its program resources to software development. Table IV [Ref. 5]
shows an example of this required increase by the McDonnell Douglas Air-
craft Company.
TABLE IV. McDonnell Douglas Resource Assignment
(percentage of development personnel)
1960 1970 198
(F-4) (F-15) (F-18)
NONCOMPUTER HARDWARE 98 74 57
EMBEDDED COMPUTER HARDWARE 1 2 3
EMBEDDED COMPUTER SOFTWARE 1 24 40
Source: Glaseman, Steven. Comparative Studies in Software Acquisition
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Unfortunately, the increased reliance on embedded software was not met
with an increased emphasis on the management of software development on
the part of both the government and industry. Over the past 15 years,
contractors have had little incentive for providing a quality product. This does
not presume there was an intent to defraud, but rather, that from a manage-
rial aspect there existed severe problems on both sides. The government
failed to use its contractual "tools/power" to identify standards of perfor-
mance, track development programs, adequately test deliverables, and
"hammer" nonperformance. The only thing that a contractor could count on
seems to have been the fact that follow-on contracts for software maintenance
and modification would somewhat reward the delivery of a non-quality prod-
uct [Ref. 7]. As we have evolved into a data processing/software dependent
environment, both parties are now well aware of the criticality of delivering a
quality product to the end user. The fact remains, however, that the man-
agement of a scftware development program can be a "nightmare" [Ref. 8].
Various reports at all governmental levels recognize that the require-
ments of today's rigid procurement system contrast with the flexibility
afforded by the current methodologies used in software development and
engineering. In other words, the tremendous flexibility offered by using soft-
ware is often stifled by the acquisition system used to procure it. With today's
shrinking defense budget, the program manager and contracting officer must
team up to formulate an acquisition strategy that will be both workable and
effective. Although a change in procurement methodology regarding software
development is often recommended, in the short term this is unlikely to occur.
Today's program managers and contracting officers must formulate their
procurement strategies within the existing laws, regulations, and guidelines
to successfully develop and field the weapon systems of tomorrow.
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B. CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
It has been eleven years since that first General Accounting Office report
was issued and we still hear the same exact story. Time after time, there are
system development, testing, production, and fielding delays, some of which
lead to entire program cancellations. These types of results in the develop-
ment of custom software for the Department of Defense, either for multipur-
pose use or embedded within a major weapon system, seems to be the norm
rather than the exception.
Recent reports indicate that software development problems are a major
factor in the current schedule delays and ithe estimated cost overruns as high
as $500 million on the Air Force's C-17 transport program. Four years after
the deployment of the B 1-B, mission critical software discrepancies still exist.
Eight years and $346 million were spent by the Air Force in trying to develop
the worldwide military command-and -control information system (WIS). The
program was rp'iamed and reassigned to the Defense Communications
Agency after persistent software development problems. [Ref 4]
The command and control center for the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) and the U.S. Space Command is the Cheyenne
Mountain Air Force Station. There, data processing equipment supporting
the command's tactical warning and attack assessment (TW/AA) mission was
scheduled for replacement in 1986. The Air Force invested approximately $72
million in the initial software upgrade to the Semi-automated Technical Con-
trol Unit. In December of 1987, formal qualification testing of the initial soft-
ware upgrade was completed. Originally scheduled for a 2-month period,
qualification testing was conducted over 10 months. The software was consid-
ered "unstable", a term applied to software that is unpredictable, and may not
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produce consistent results when run against a known set of operating
conditions. [Ref. 9]
The sister system to the one described above is the Air Force's Space
Defense Operations Center (SPADOC) aiso at the Cheyenne Mountain com-
plex. It too has had some major problems. After a $235 million investment in
the system and a four year schedule slip, SPADOC could only meet seven of
the 23 mission functions stated in the contract. Last year's estimates showed
a program cost growth of over 65% to $437 million with the original operating
date of June 1988 being slid until sometime in fiscal year 1994. [Ref. 10]
Recently, the Army announced a 26 month slip in IOC for their
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, an integral part of their Tac-
tical Command and Control System. The number one cause for the delay,
cited in a GAO report, was "software development and reliability problems".
[Ref. 11] Between the program's approval in 1986, and a similar GAO report
to Congress in December 1989, cost to complete estimates had risen by $600
million [Ref. 12]. The Navy's next generation attack submarine, the SSN-21
Seawolf, will not be fully mission capable when delivered in 1993. It's combat
system, the AN/BSY-2, will not be fully operational because, "it will lack cer-
tain necessary software". [Ref. 13]
No Service is exempt from their share of the problems. The Marine
Corps cancelled the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS)
program after a 12 year development effort at a cost in excess of $200 million.
One of the major reasons for cancellation of the program was the
government's inability to manage the development of the computer software
required to meet the MIFASS mission need [Ref. 14,151.
General Bernard Randolf, chief of the Air Force Systems Command,
summed up the government's track record in software acquisition, "On
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software schedules, we've got a perfect record: We haven't met one yet" [Ref.
4: 29].
C. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
There are two legislative actions that affect the procurement of auto-
mated data processing (ADP) equipment, to include computer software. The
first was an amendment to The Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act of 1949, and is commonly referred to as the Brooks Bill (PL 89-306).
Enacted by Congress in 1965, this bill established the authority and proce-
dure for consolidating all ADP activities such as purchasing, leasing, equip-
ment transfer, servicing, and maintenance. It made the General Services
Administration (GSA) responsible for coordinating all ADP procurement
activities in the Government. Federal agencies no longer had the authority to
determine their own ADP policies. [Ref. 16,17]
Congress passed the second legislative action regarding ADP procure-
ment in 1981 as an amendment to the Fiscal Year 1982 Appropriations Act
(PL 97-86). Known as the Warner Amendment, this law excluded the De-
partment of Defense from the provisions of the Brooks Bill when the ADP
equipment:
...involves intelligence activities; involves cryptologic activities related
to national security; involves the command and control of military
forces; involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or
weapon system; or subject to subsection (b), is critical to the direct
fulfillment of military or intelligence missions.
Subsection (b) specifically states that routine administrative and business
ADP equipment is not excluded. [Ref. 18]
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D. ACQUISITION REGUIATIONS
There are two major acquisition regulations that govern Department of
Defense procurement efforts. They are the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) and the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Sup-
plement, the DFARS. While the FAR provides thousands of pages of
regulatory guidance to the contracting officer and the program manager, it
does not differentiate between contracting for software development and
contracting for any other goods or services. The FAR deals with the
mechanics of contracting vice strategy formulation.
Part 270 of the DFARS addresses the acquisition of computer resources.
The majority of information provided in this section, however, is merely a
reiteration of the legislative requirements governing the procurement of
ADPE. Other than a one page description of the Warner Amendment exclu-
sions to the Brooks Bill, it does not address the procurement of custom
designed or em' added software. [Ref. 19]
E. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT GUIDANCE
The Department of Defense has published various documents issued as
either directives or instructions regarding the department's procurement pro-
grams. Keeping in mind the basis for this research is managerial in nature,
the major acquisition directives are discussed below. Many other directives
specifically addressing software development issues have been promulgated.
They, however, deal with specific technical requirements rather than overall
acquisition strategies and will, therefore, not be addressed.
1. DOD Directive 5000.1
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, dated 1 September 1987,
and titled, Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs, provides
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guidance to the Services regarding the classification of procurements. DOD
procurements are classified as major programs if their cost will exceed $1 bil-
lion in total procurement funding or if their total research, development, test
and evaluation (RDT&E) funding will exceed $200 million. There are no
direct references to software development programs. The two threshold crite-
ria, as well as the other provisions of the directive, would apply to programs
involving software development. There are other criteria by which a program
can be designated as a major acquisition, such as the amount of Congres-
sional interest. [Ref. 20]
2. DOD Instruction 5000.2
"Defense Acquisition Program Procedures," DOD Instruction
5000.2, establishes uniform procedures regarding the procurement of major
programs. This document mostly discusses the approval process through the
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and the necessary paperwork trail required
to document te program. It, again, does not specifically address any of the
aspects of software development within the acquisition cycle. [Ref. 21]
3. DOD Directive 5000.3
The first major publication that delineates guidance regarding
software development is DOD Directive 5000.3, Test and Evaluation (T&E).
This directive establishes specific policy concerning the test and evaluation
of computer software. It requires that the, "principles and methodologies
provided in DOD 5000.3-Manual-3 be applied to the T&E of system computer
software." The manual itself provides guidance for addressing software in the
Test and Evaluation Master Plan. [Ref. 22]
4. DOD Directive 5000.29
DOD Directive 5000.29, Management of Computer Resources in
Major Defense Systems, "establishes the policy for the management and
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control of computer resources (hardware and software) during the develop-
ment, acquisition, deployment, and support of major defense systems." This
directive requires programs to validate mission requirements, conduct
appropriate risk analyses, and provide for complete planning throughout the
computer resource life cycle. [Ref. 231
F. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY PROCUREMENT DIRECTIWES
The majority of the Department of the Navy's procurement guidance
implements the Federal and Department of Defense acquisition requirements
within the Navy. Specific directives regarding the development of software
begins to focus more on the Navy's philosophy for the management of mission
critical computer resources.
1. SECNAVINST 5200.32
This instruction, "Management of ECR in the Department of the
Navy," implements DOD guidance for the management of computer resources
in defense systems within the Department of the Navy. It also promulgates
additional policies and procedures for the management of Navy weapons,
communications, command, control and intelligence systems when embedded.
[Ref. 24]
2. SECNAVINST 5200.37
The Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5200.37 entitled, "Acquisition
of Software-Intensive C2 Information Systems," delineates acquisition policy
for software-intensive command and control information systems. This
instruction promotes, "routine user involvement in software development pro-
cess... encourages rapid fielding of needed capabilities." [Ref. 25]
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3. OPNAVINST 5200.28
This instruction, "Life Cycle Management of Mission Critical Com-
puter Resources for Navy Systems Managed Under the Research, Develop-
ment and Acquisition Process," amplifies SECNAV and OPNAV policies for
the acquisition, management, and life cycle support of software and related
computer resources. Provisions of the Standard Embedded Computer
Resources Review Program are also implemented within the Navy. [Ref. 25]
4. MCO P5000.10C
Although Marine Corps Order P5000.10C, the "Systems Acquisition
Management Manual," states its purpose is to, "publish management guid-
ance and procedures.. .for the acquisition of weapon systems, computer re-
sources, and equipment..." it makes little reference to software development.
The manual refers to software development in a single subparagraph in a
brief overview of Full Scale Development (FSD). It does not give the program
manager sufficiait guidance regarding mission critical computer resources
(MCCR). The order does refer the reader to MCO 5200.23 to find the policy
and procedures for the management of MCCR. [Ref. 26]
5. MCO 5200.23A
Marine Corps Order 5200.23A, "Management of Mission Critical
Computer Resources (MCCR) in the Marine Corps," implements the policies
and guidance promulgated by the Department of Defense and the Secretary
of the Navy. It establishes a Marine Corps policy for the acquisition and
management of MCCR. The order states its purpose as, "to reduce the life
cycle support costs of all Marine Corps mission critical systems by reducing
the proliferation of mission critical system hardware and software." [Ref. 271
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6. Naval Systems Command Instructions
Various instructions and guidance have been promulgated by each
of the Navy's Systems Commands. The Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR), the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and the Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) have all issued their own pro-
gram manager's policy guidance regarding software development. Most of
these instructions direct the implementation of DOD guidance and assign
areas of responsibility within the command. [Ref. 25]
7. Tactical Digital Standards (TADSTAND)
A series of policy documents have been developed by the Navy
regarding system software development and support. Published as Tactical
Digital Standards (TADSTAND's), they provide guidance for the standardiza-
tion of such things as; embedded computers, computer peripherals,
input/output interfaces, standardized languages, software testing and docu-
mentation requirements for the Navy's mission critical systems.
TADSTAND's serve to both mandate the use of certain DOD Standards in
software development and testing, and also identify the Navy's unique mis-
sion critical computer resources requirements. [Ref. 8,25]
G. SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS
The Department of Defense publishes a series of reference documents
which can be used by all parties in military procurement. These docu-
ments fall into three categories; Military Handbooks, Military Specifications
and Military Standards. Handbooks bring together procedural and technical
or design information related to components, processes or services.
Specifications are complete and detailed descriptions of products which are
either strictly military in nature, or are modified commercial products
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requiring special features to satisfy military mission needs. Standards
describe engineering and management processes, methods and design
criteria, testing techniques, and data collection requirements. It is important
to remember that handbooks, specifications, and standards are merely guides
to assist the government's program manager and contracting officer. They are
not laws. Once placed in a contract, however, they become legally binding.
The major specifications and standards regarding software development are
outlined in this section.
1. DOD-STD-1467
Although primarily written as an Army document, "Military Stan-
dard Software Support Environment," is available for use by all Departments
of DOD. This document provides the uniform minimum requirements for the
contractor to define a Development Software Support Environment (DSSE),
to ensure compatibility with the government's designated Life Cycle Software
Support Environment (LCSSE). In other words, the program manager, the
contracting officer, and the contractor must plan for the life cycle support of
deliverable software throughout the development cycle. This makes all three
parties not only aware, but also, responsible for software support after the
software becomes operational. The standard is written in such a way as to not
dictate a specific approach, but to allow the software contractor, "the flexibil-
ity to develop software and manage the contract in accordance with the con-
tractor's best judgment and practices." [Ref. 28]
2. DOD-STD-1703
This standard, "Software Product Standards," looks at the software
development process more from a manager's perspective. It is the best docu-
ment to use as a guide in the formulation of an acquisition strategy for a
software development program. It provides the program/project manager
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valuable guidance, without giving the impression that the recommendations
provided are mandated. DOD-STD-1703 encourages the manager to tailor
program requirements, up-front, placing emphasis on the requirement for
proper documentation of the contractor's efforts, rather than attempting to
control or direct those efforts. Table V provides some basic questions that the
program manager must answer when tailoring program requirements.
TABLE V. Factors that Affect Program Requirements
1. How large and how complex is the software product ?
2. Who will use the software product ?
3 How long will it be used ?
4. Will someone be required to provide life-cycle support for the product after
it is developed ?
5. During development, which of the following does the customer consider
most important: cost control, schedule control, or functional capability ?
6. What are the development risks ?
7. How large is the development staff ?
Source: DOD-STD-1703
Table VI provides, "the axioms of software development," some very basic and
simple guidance, but at the same time some very valid and valuable rules to
live by. [Ref. 29]
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TABLE VI. Axioms of Software Development
1. To be successful, a software project must be well-managed.
2. Good management requires planning, attention to detail, and discipline.
3. Documentation is a primary vehicle with which managers manage.
4. Until a software product is tested, no one will know its quality.
5. Both customers and users have a vital role to play in any software
development effort; documentation gives them the information necessary
to perform their role.
Source: DOD-STD-1 703
3. DOD-STD-2167A
Published in 1988, the standard for "Defense Systems Software
Development," is the latest guidance promulgated by the DOD. It establishes
uniform standards for software development that are applicable throughout
the system's life cycle. DOD-STD-2167A establishes the requirements, how-
ever, it does not specify how the contractor is to meet those requirements. For
example, the requirement to have a software management structure in place
is worded as follows; "...the contractor shall implement a process for
managing the development of the deliverable software." Again, emphasis is
placed on the program manager's ability to determine his particular needs,
and tailor his project requirements accordingly. All aspects of software
design, development and testing are addressed in this standard. [Ref. 30]
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4. DOD-STD-2168
DOD Standard 2168, "Defense System Software Quality Program,"
contains the requirements for the development, documentation and imple-
mentation of a software quality program. It interprets the applicable quality
requirements set forth in MIL-Q-9858, the most stringent of the quality
assurance specifications, for software. Published in 1988, it supersedes the
long standing software quality assurance guidance found in MIL-S-52799A.
[Ref. 31]
5. MIL-HDBK-286
This handbook, "Software Quality Evaluation," is currently avail-
able only as a draft, and is intended to be used with DOD-STD-2168. It pro-
vides guidelines for applying the requirements of the Department's Software
Quality Program. [Ref. 32]
6. MIL-HDBK-287
Military Handbook-287, published in 1989, is "A Tailoring Guide for
DOD-STD-2167A, Defense System Software Development." It provides just
that, guidance to the program managers and other program office personnel
for tailoring the requirements of 2167 for a software development or support
contract. [Ref. 33]
7. MIL.HDBK-782
This handbook, "Software Support Environment Acquisition," was
written to provide personnel not familiar with the requirements of DOD-STD-
1467 the fundamentals required to ensure supportability on contracted soft-
ware development programs. Emphasis is placed on the concern for software
supportability beyond the contractual delivery date and its subsequent oper-
ational use. It is intended for use by all personnel in the procurement process
responsible for ensuring life cycle software supportability. [Ref. 34]
22
H. MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE
There are many documents that are readily available to assist the
Navy/Marine Corps program manager and his staff through the various
phases of an acquisition. Although these documents are informal, that is,
they are not published through the Navy Directives Issuance System, they
often provide the insight necessary for the program manager to perform suc-
cessfully. Three examples that would be pertinent to the acquisition of com-
puter software are cited below.
1. RDT&E/Acquisition Management Guide
The Navy's, "Research Development Test & Evaluation/Acquisition
Management Guide - 11th Edition," published in January of 1989 misses the
mark when it comes to assisting the program manager with software devel-
opment issues. There is a only one paragraph addressing mission critical
computer resources. Unfortunately, it does not address development or test-
ing requirements, but rather, the requirement for an approved Computer
Resources Life Cycle Management Plan (CRLCMP) prior to the Milestone II
decision point. It says in part:
Advanced, fully integrated weapons, avionics, intelligence, and
command, control and communications technologies are gaining
increasing importance in Navy and inter-service weapons systems. The
nuclei of such integrated systems are embedded Mission Critical
Computer Resources (MCCR)... [Ref. 35: 2-19]
Although the document seemingly recognizes the "increased importance" of
embedded software, it fails to provide any further guidance. [Ref. 35]
2. Acquisition Strategy Guide
In 1984, the Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir,
Virginia published the "Acquisition Strategy Guide." Its purpose was to pro-
vide, "information that Program Managers should find useful in structuring,
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developing, and executing an acquisition strategy." Like the RDT&E manual,
this publication addresses the mechanical aspects of strategy formulation. It
fails to identify any unique strategy formulation requirements when dealing
with the development of custom designed, embedded software. It does not
recognize the difference between hardware and software; it merely addresses
programs as a whole. [Ref. 36]
3. Navy Program Manager's Guide
The "Navy Program Manager's Guide" is the first publication
found that places the importance of software development management in
perspective:
The combat launch of an aircraft without its missiles or the
sortie of a submarine without its torpedoes makes successful destruc-
tion of enemy forces highly unlikely. To any professional, this fact is
obvious.... Far fewer, however, know that a weapon systems with full
armament installed may be equally failure-prone because of embedded
computer resource (ECR) deficiencies. ... PM's universally have become
aware that we can no longer fly, dive, steam or fight without ECRs in
most of our ,weapons. We use ECRs to make our systems operate, to
test them, to produce them, to adapt them, and to keep them respon-
sive to changing threats. [Ref. 8: 4-67]
The manager is made aware of the critical role that embedded computer
resources, and their management, play in mission accomplishment. The guide
provides the program manager a "heads-up" stating, "Software management
has been recognized by successful PM's as requiring early, intensive, continu-
ing management." It goes on to provide excellent guidance in general terms
and recommends various sources of assistance available within the Navy.
[Ref. 8]
I. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the background for the complex environment
in which program managers and contracting officers must operate when
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procuring embedded software. The software development costs associated
with major weapon system programs can be astronomical. Armed with very
little formal guidance these "procurement experts" must operate within the
law to ensure a quality product is delivered on time and on budget. When it
comes to contracting for custom software the program manager and contract-
ing officer are actually afforded alot of flexibility. They must rely heavily on
their common sense approach and good business judgment. Problem pro-
grams quickly come under the scrutiny of the Congress, the GAO, the IG's,
and various auditors. Chapter III will discuss the specific types of contracts
available to the program manager and contracting officer for the procurement
of embedded software.
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III. CONTRACTING FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The single most important document in the procurement of custom
designed software is the contract itself. The contract acts as the legal basis for
performance, and the importance of stating in the contract what, in fact, is
intended can not be overemphasized. The government and the contractor
must collectively enter into this agreement, understanding that it is a mutual
effort with both parties having their own responsibilities. Various types of
contracts are outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The first
consideration in choosing a contract type is usually that of risk assumption.
The spectrum of contract types range from a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee type con-
tract in which the government assumes the majority of the risk, to a Firm-
Fixed-Price type contract which places the greatest risk on the contractor.
This chapter will provide a brief overview of the types of contracts that may
be used for the acquisition of custom developed software.
B. COST REIMBURSABLE CONTRACTS
A cost reimbursable contract is one that allows the contractor to receive
payment for all costs that are deemed "allowable and allocable". These type
contracts do not contain a cost ceiling, thus the government assumes the
majority of the risk. The contractor provides the government with an esti-
mate to complete the task, however, the contractor is not bound by that esti-
mate. It is possible to expend all of the funds allocated for a particular
program and have a situation where the contractor is not legally bound to
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produce a deliverable. The following are variations of this cost reimbursable
concept.
1. Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee
A cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract is a cost reimbursement con-
tract that establishes a fixed fee payment to the contractor. The contract price
is based on a negotiated cost to complete the required task plus a negotiated
contractor's fee. The contractor is not legally bound by this negotiated cost
figure. As implied by the contract name, the contractor's fee remains fixed
regardless of total contract price to the government. The contractor receives
the negotiated fee regardless of the actual costs incurred. At the same time,
the contractor has a legal claim for his actual costs. Under this arrangement
the government assumes the majority of the risk, and the contractor has little
incentive to control costs. [Ref. 37: 16.306]
2. Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee
In a cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract the government and the
contractor agree to a target cost based on the required task. Like the CPFF
contract, the contractor has the right to be reimbursed for all allowable
expenses incurred. The difference, however, is that the contractor's fee is
adjusted by using a formula that compares the total allowable costs to the
negotiated target cost. Thus, the contractor has the incentive to effectively
manage cost control. At the onset of the effort, a target cost, target fee, a min-
imum and maximum fee, and an adjustment formula are negotiated. If the
contractor completes the task below the target cost the fee is adjusted upward
based on a cost share ratio established in the contract. Likewise, if the con-
tractor's actual costs are over the target cost the fee will be adjusted down-
ward. The minimum and maximum fee figures are included in the contract,
on the one hand, to protect the contractor from being in the position of having
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to work for no fee, and on the other, to prevent the contractor from taking cost
short cuts to merely increase his profit. This type contract is best suited for a
development effort when a realistic target fee and target cost can be negoti-
ated that will effectively incentivize the contractor to control costs. [Ref. 37:
16.404-1]
3. Cost-Plus-Award-Fee
A cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract is also a reimbursable type
contract. Under this type arrangement the contractor's fee is divided into two
parts. The first consists of a base fee established at the onset of the contract,
and the second, consists of an award amount or pool that is set aside. The
contractor may earn all or part of this award fee pool based on the govern-
ment's "judgmentai evaluation" of the contractor's performance. The intent is
to monetarily reward the contractor for performance above the minimally
accepted standard set at the beginning of the contract. Like other incentive
type contracts, the contractor can be rewarded for technical performance, sup-
portability and reliability achievements, or superior quality. A service con-
tract to run a military dining facility can be used as a simple example. An
award pool could be structured to incentivize the quality of the contractor's
food, service, and cleanliness requirements beyond that which was estab-
lished as the minimum acceptable standard in the contract. A government
appointed person or committee periodically awards portions of the monetary
pool based on their subjective impressions of the contractor's performance.
[Ref. 37: 16.404-2]
C. FIXED PRICE CONTRACTS
In a fixed price type contract the contractor is legally bound to deliver
the goods or services for a predetermined price regardless of his actual costs.
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This type contract is most appropriate in a production type buy where
product cdesigns have been stabilized. "Key features of a fixed-price contract
are: contractor promises to deliver on time, per specification, for a fixed price,
and the government promises to pay the fixed price if the product/service con-
forms to the contract" [Ref. 38]. In this type agreement, the contractor
assumes majority of the cost risk. There several variations of the fixed price
type contract listed in Part 16 of the FAR. They are listed below:
• Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP)
* Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment (FPE)
" Fixed-Price Incentive, Firm Target (FPIF)
* Fixed-Price Incentive, Successive Targets (FPIS)
* Fixed-Price with Prospective Price Redetermination (FPRP)
* Fixed-Price Retroactive Price Redetermination (FPRR)
* Firm-Fixed-Price, Level of Effort (FFP, LOE)
When contractT.g for software developiient, typically used contract types can
be placed in four general categories. They are discussed below.
1. Firm-Fixed-Price
The simplest of any contracts is the firm-fixed-price agreement. In
this agreement, the contractor is paid the contract price upon acceptance of
the work. There are no adjustments to total price regardless of the actual cost
to perform. The contractor's profit or loss posture has no bearing on the price
paid once the contract is awarded. This arrangement, "provides maximum in-
centive for the contractor to control costs and perform effectively and impose




Fixed-price-incentive contracts have one of two options. They will
either have an established Firm Target (FPIF) or a series of Successive Tar-
gets (FPIS). Both of these arrangements provide for an adjustment to the
contractor's profit based on the relationship between the final negotiated total
contract cost and the target cost established at contract award. At the onset
of the contract, a target cost, target profit, ceiling price, and a share ratio for
establishing the final profit and price are negotiated. At the completion of the
contract a final contract price is determined, and the contractor's profit
posture reflects the application of this negotiated share formula. When the
final cost is more than the target cost, the contractor's profit will be less than
the target profit, and in some cases may even result in a net loss. With profit
tied to this share ratio, the contractor is incentivized to control costs. The ceil-
ing is established to protect the government from paying more than that total
price for the conLract. Unlike the cost reimbursable contracts, the contractor
must satisfactorily complete the contract task in the form of a service or
deliverable regardless of cust. Tlk ua 'ify'eirce b tween the two FPI
contracts is the time at which the share formula is applied. In a successive
target situation, the share ratio is computed at different times throughout a
production effort. The FPIS contract would be appropriate in a situation
where the cost or pricing data were not adequate at the beginning of the pro-
duction run to negotiate a firm-fixed-price contract. [Ref. 37: 16.403]
3. Fixed-Price with Economic Adjustment
When the contracting officer determines that the market conditions
are so unstable that the either government or the contractor need to be
afforded some level of protection, an economic adjustment type contract is
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appropriate. Section 16.203-1 of the FAR identifies three contingencies for
price adjustments:
(1) Adjustments based on established prices.
(2) Adjustments based on actual costs of labor or material.
(3) Adjustments based on cost indexes of labor or material.
The upward or downward adjustments may be up to ten percent of the con-
tract's base price. The price adjustment clause in the contract lists specific
contingencies upon which the price adjustment will take effect. Other than
these delineated events the contract is executed virtually the same as a firm-
fixed-price contract. This type of contract would not normally be used in a
software development effort, it is however possible, and is included for pur-
poses of this discussion. [Ref. 37: 16.203]
4. Level of Effort
Typically used for a feasibility type study in a research or develop-
ment effort, the cuntract establishes a firm-fixed-price for a specified level of
effort rather than an end product. Payment is based on the level of work
expended and not the achieved results. The scopc of the work is loosely
defined allowing the contractor the greatest flexibility. For example, the gov-
ernment might hire a contractor to perform 1000 man-hours of research. The
contractor assumes almost no financial risk, in that, he will get paid for
expending those 1000 hours regardless of the outcome. [Ref. 37: 16.207]
D. OTHER CONTRACT OPTIONS
The FAR also states that contracts, "may be of any type or combination
of types that will promote the Government's interest..." [Ref. 37 16.102.b]
Gerald Lee Francom, while a student at the Naval Postgraduate School,
explored the feasibility of using a Fixed-Price-Award-Fee contract. He
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combined the advantages of the Fixed-Price contract with the incentive
provisions of an Award Fee contract and proposed that this type contract be
recognized within the FAR. [Ref. 39]
The Air Force has in the past used this combination of contract types
with great success. The improvement program for the B-1B bomber Computer
Integrated Test System (CITS) was awarded under a Fixed Price Incentive
Firm with an Award Fee (FPIF/AF). The original contract specification called
for a two percent or less false-alarm rate which was met by the contractor.
After the system was delivered this government specified rate was deemed to
be inadequate by the end users. Thus, a program to reduce the number of
CITS false-alarms was undertaken. Under the FPIF/AF pricing arrangement,
the contractor was incentivized to provide high management emphasis on
quality, timeliness, and cost-effectiveness during this effort. The resultant
program produced a false-alarm rate that was below .03 percent. In this case,
the incentive cotitract, "resulted in a true win/win situation for both the gov-
ernment and the contractor." [Ref. 40]
E. CHOOSING THE PROPER CONTRACT
"Selecting the contract type is generally a matter for negotiation and
requires the exercise of sound judgment" [Ref. 37: 16.103]. Contracting offi-
cers are given the latitude, in most cases, to choose the type of contract that
best suits their particular needs. As previously stated, the gaiting factor in
this decision is usually the question of "risk assumption". The two risks that
are analyzed prior to choosing a contract type are cost risk and technical risk.
A third risk in the formula is schedule, however, schedule risk is mostly a
function of the other two. Dr. Harvey J. Gordon, in an article discussing the
role of the contract stated:
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Not all major weapon system contracts are designed to accomplish
precisely the same purpose. There are, however, invariants that thread
a common course. Despite differences in contracting technique, we
strive always for the lowest possible cost, timely delivery, and maxi-
mum technical accomplishment within cost and schedule constraints.
[Ref. 41: 30]
Every program manager and contracting officer attempts to accomplish this
not so easy task. An accurate assessment and subsequent assignment or
assumption of risk is a critical factor in achieving this goal. Selection of the
proper type of contract assigns cost, schedule and technical risk to the appro-
priate party.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter provided an overview of the specific contract types outlined
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. It also showed that the contracting
officer is given the flexibility to choose the contract type that bests suits the
program's needs. The ultimate goal is to achieve a win/win situation using the
appropriate contract type. The government will receive a quality produce/
service and the contractor will earn a fair and reasonable profit.
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IV. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
A. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY
The classical approach to software development, known as the "waterfall
model," is illustrated in Figure 4.1 [Ref. 42]. This approach is quite compati-
ble with the government's current contracting philosophy. Using this classical
software development method, requirements are defined "up-front", similar
to the acquisition
I S Y S T E M
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Figure 4-1. Classic Software Life Cycle
process of publishing a detailed specification or statement of work. A contract
is awarded delineating the specific design criteria in detail. The contractor
designs and tests in accordance with the contractual specifications. Very little
flexibility is afforded to either the contractor or the government once these
requirements are integrated into the development contract. System develop-
ment, especially in the case of complex weapon systems, very rarely follows
34
the clearly defined sequential waterfall model. In the real world, users do not
easily communicate or sometimes even know their true requirements. Con-
tracting officers do not easily translate user requirements into definitized
contracts. Software engineers do, in fact, need the flexibility during design to
accommodate the inherent unknowns in software development.
The more modern approach to development, illustrated in Figure 4.2
[Ref. 42], uses what is known as "rapid prototyping." Using this concept, the
user will define a group of objectives for the software to be built. This quick
REQUIREMENTS -
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design concentrates on generalized functions of the software, paying particu-
lar attention to those aspects of the program which are visible to the user.
The quick design evolves into a prototype. The prototype then serves as the
tool to identify the user's true requirements. It is probably safe to assume
that in the majority of design efforts the user does not have a real handle on
what is required, at least to the level of detail that would be necessary to
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begin full scale software development. Initial concepts will most likely
change. The impact of this change will vary depending on the stage of the
program. Dr. Roger S. Pressman's comparison of the cost of change is illus-
trated in Figure 4.3 [Ref. 42: 17]. The use of an iterative process through pro-
totyping allows maximum interface between the ultimate user and the
developer. Prototyping prior to full development accommodates this
inevitable change. It does so at the easiest and least costly point in the soft-
ware life cycle. Thus, the user better identifies his requirements and the
developer better understands those requirements.
COST TO
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Figure 4.3. Cost impact of Change
The program manager's ability to create this environment where the end
user plays an integral role in the early stages of development is one of the
essential elements in a successful program. Afterall, who better knows the
true mission requirements than thc end user. On the other hand, extreme
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care must be taken to not allow the user to "gold plate" the requirements, just
because the software capability exists. If the requirement is to track ten in-
bound airborne targets simultaneously, then that should be the design crite-
ria. The attitude that it "sure would be nice" to track 100 inbound targets
should be stifled if the tactical mission and/or the hardware will not support
that requirement. The fact that the software can "easily" accomplish this task
is not relevant. Respondents to this thesis' survey overwhelmingly cited the
inability to identify the user's requirements as the number one problem in
software development today. Here, the program manager and contracting
officer assume the role of mediator.
The prototyping philosophy seems to be accepted by industry (and, as a
matter of fact, the government) as the best approach to a new software devel-
opment program. Unfortunately, there exists an inherent conflict between
this approach and the today's acquisition system. The government's procure-
ment system orerates on the premise that all work will be specified in detail
before the contract is awarded. The prototype approach uses broad functional
descriptions to loosely define the end product's objectives, not the work to be
performed, ergo, the conflict. The program manger and contracting officer's
ultimate challenge is to choose the best design philosophy and fit it into a
contractual mechanism.
B. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT
As program managers and contracting officers, on both sides, become
more software literate, the ability to contract for software development
should become somewhat easier. At least to the extent that all players in the
contracting process will have some understanding and appreciation for the
differences between hardware and software development. In addition to our
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inability to identify user requirements, a second problem area is simply our
unfamiliarity with the software development process. Typically, today's pro-
gram manager was brought up though the ranks in one of the technical
disciplines other than software engineering. Just ask any of them a hardware
related question at a program review, and then stand by for a lengthy disser-
tation on every design detail. Ask that same manager a software related
question and you will get the, "things are right on schedule" answer. Realiz-
ing that this whole software reliance environment is a relatively new field, it
will still take some time before a true appreciation of the software design pro-
cess is attained.
Watts S. Humphrey, of the Software Engineering Institute, outlines six
common misconceptions about the software process. He lists:
* We must start with firm requirements. There is a widespread but
fallacious view that requirements are the customers' job and that
development should not start until they are explicitly defined.
" If it passes test, it must be OK. If the generally dismal record of
software quality problems doesn't prove this false, nothing will.
* Software quality can't be measured. While not as well recognized,
this too is false.
* The problems are technical. In spite of the many improved lan-
guages, tools, and environments, the problems of software cost,
schedule, and quality remain.
* We need better people. Since software professionals make the errors,
some people erroneously feel that they should be blamed for them.
* Software management is different. While this is a new and unique
field, traditional management methods can and should be used.
[Ref. 43: 25]
Mr. Humphrey further states that, "The remarkable thing about these mis-
conceptions is that even though most software professionals recognize their
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fallacy our contracts and our management systems are largely based on
them." [Ref. 43:25]
As stated earlier, although recognized as the most effective and efficient
way to develop software to meet new requirements, the prototyping approach
basically conflicts with contracting practices. One of the things that Mr.
Humphrey has done is to look at the mind-set of those in the procurement
business. He looks at software contracting in terms of trust.
How would buyers behave if they did not trust their vendors, doubted
their competence, and believed in their own ? Under these conditions,
they would probably do the following:
1. Start with a very precise statement of what was wanted.
2. Insist on rigid standards and detailed documentation of every
step.
3. Require that each step be completed and approved before the
next was initiated.
4. Demand a firm commitment at the outset. [Ref. 43: 411]
Humphrey is not implying that software developers are dishonest liars,
cheaters or stealers, but rather, that trust is a relational attitude between
program managers and contracting officers and the contractor. Like in any
other relationship, trust is slow to evolve and quick to evaporate. Trust is
developed over time as the two parties become familiar with each other.
Humphrey, on the other hand, warns, "while trust is important, blind faith is
not. There is, however, an enormous difference between an adversarial con-
tract and one with a reasonable level of arm's-length protection" [Ref. 43:
413].
This basic principal of trust readily applies in the software contracting
environment. It is unfortunate, however, that the entire software develop-
ment environment is judged on those instances where success is not
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optimum. In other words, successful software development programs are not
news worthy. On the other hand, as highlighted in Chapter II, the "not so
successful" development programs consume such a tremendous amount of
resources that all programs tend to be approached with skepticism. This
skepticism can have a positive benefit if it results in a management, inspec-
tion, quality, and test program that will audit developmental efforts. If done
properly, the results will be an environment of trust, the win/win relationship
that we strive to achieve.
C. SOFTWARE QUALITY
In Chapter I, quality was equated to the software's ability to meet the
user's ultimate mission need. Although from the user's perspective this
approach may be adequate, from a management perspective it is much too
simplistic. The program manager and contracting officer must be able to
track the program through all stages of development. Management's assess-
ment of the development program cannot be based solely on the contractor's
ability to satisfy user requirements and/or meet scheduled milestones. This
approach would imply that the manager might not have a clue as to the real
status of the software development program until the end product is deliv-
ered. It should be obvious that this "wait and see" approach is not very wise
considering the consequences of a embedded software development program
that suffers cost overruns and schedule delays. Software quality must there-
fore be defined in terms other than customer satisfaction. It is difficult, at
best, to define and quantify measures of software quality.
Measures of quality can be grouped into five general classes: Develop-
ment, Product, Acceptance, Usage, and Repair. Table VII [Ref. 43: 339]
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TABLE VII. Classes of Quality Measures
Ob ' i:,v' Timely Availabie Representative Controllable
Development
Defects yes yes yes moderate yes
Change activity yes yes yes poor no
Product
Error seeding moderate yes difficult doubtful moderate
Software structure depends yes moderate doubtful yes
Controlled tests moderate yes difficult good yes
Acceptance
Problems no late yes good moderate
Install effort moderate late difficult good yes
Usage
Problems no late yes good moderate
Operating effort moderate late difficult good yes
Surveys no late difficult very good no
Availability yes late moderate very good yes
Repair
Defects yes late yes moderate yes
Repair effort moderate late moderate moderate yes
Source: Humphrey, Watts S. Managing the Software Process
depicts a matrix that characterizes of each of these categories with respect to
objectivity, timeliness, availability, the degree to which the buyer believes it
is good (representation), and controllability. The program manager must
choose those criteria which will best serve the program's needs. He must then
translate those criteria into contractual requirements. Those contractual
requirements must, in turn, be in such a format and language as to allow
their effective use. The program manager will undoubtedly have access to
technical assistance, but simplicity and ease of use by nontechnical decision
makers will remain the key to useful management measurements/tools. The
intent, here, is not to provide a detailed explanation of each of the criteria. It
is, however, to show that there are many criteria with varying degrees of
appropriateness depending on the nature of the program for measuring
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software quality. Each of the criteria can play a vital role in measuring
program success. For example, one of the quality measuring criteria calls for
the monitoring of defects during development. Commonly experienced error
rates between 1 and 3 errors per 1000 lines of code (kloc) seem somewhat
trivial, and in the past somewhat acceptable. Today's increased reliance on
software to satisfy weapon systems' mission requirements, however, make
these numbers unacceptable. It is estimatd that the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) program will total over 25 million lines of code. Applying the
1-3/kloc error rate would mean between 25,000 and 75,000 errors ii. the
operational and support program [Ref. 44: 93-94]. Management attention
must be turned toward the process, not just the result. "To consistently
achieve superior performance, management must establish challenging
quality goals and strive to meet them" [Ref. 43: 358].
D. MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENTS
The first step in developing the relationship of trust, as previously dis-
cussed, is to establish a baseline with regard to a contractor's capabilities.
Taking the Total Quality Management (TQM) approach, this means not only
an assessment of the contractor's capabilities, but more importantly, an
assessment of his organizational software development process. Quality is a
direct reflection of the company's process. A concentrated effort/pressure
should be applied on the contractor to improve his own process, thus, result-
ing in an improvement to quality. The Software Engineering Institute (SEI),
Carnegie Mellon University, has issued two technical reports that can aid the
program manager during this assessment.
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1. A Method for Assessing the Software Engineering Capability
of Contractors. (CMU/SEI-87-TR-23)
The purpose of this document is to, "facilitate objective and consis-
tent assessments of the ability of potential DOD contractors to develop soft-
ware in accordance with modem engineering methods" [Ref. 45: 1]. Requested
by the U.S. Air Force, this effort was a result of the realization that the
government must be able to effectively evaluate the capabilities of potential
contractors. An extremely straight forward document, it provides a series of
questions to evaluate the contractor's software development process. It is an
outstanding tool for every program manager, contracting officer, and source
selection participant. The intent of this program is to provide potential con-
tractors with a questionnaire, based on this document. An assessment team is
then sent to each of the contractors' facilities to address each of the questions
in detail collecting data to make their final evaluation.
2. Conducting SEI-Assisted Software Process Assessments
This document describes the Software Engineering Institute's pro-
cedure for assessing a contractor's software process. It is not intended as a
guide that can be used by the program manager, it does however, provide a
description of the Software Engineering Institute's capability to review an
organization's software process. The assessment will determine the software
process that is being used, identify key areas for improvement, and provide
the contractor with assistance for implementing and monitoring the changes.
While this level of effort may not be appropriate for all programs, the pro-
gram manager should consider an early assessment of the contractor's pro-
cess. For many of the major development programs, this guide would be
excellent. [Ref. 46]
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E. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON MILITARY
SOFTWARE
In -ate 1987, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Software
forwarded its report to the Secretary of Defense. The Board reported on the
various initiatives within the Department of Defense aimed at improving
software development. They included the Ada programming standard, the
Software Technology for Adaptable, Reliable Systems (STARS), the Strategic
Computing Initiative, the Software Engineering Institute, and the Strategic
Defense Initiative. the Executive Summary of this report stated:
... The big problems are not technical. In spite of the substantial techni-
cal development needed in requirements-setting, metrics and mea-
sures, tools, etc., the Task Force is convinced that today's major
problems with military software development are not technical, but
management problems.. .[Ref. 47: 1]
F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SOFTWARE MASTER PLAN
One step in the right direction is the publication of the Department of
Defense's "Software Master Plan". Released in preliminary draft form during
February, 1990, it is the Department of Defense's first effort to recognize and
bring to light the unique problems associated with military software devel-
opment. It begins with a description of the various activities that have a
management role in software procurement. It begins, "In order to identify
actions required to improve the software management process, an under-
standing of the current software management roles.. .within the DOD is
essential" [Ref. 25: A-i]. The significant issue here is the realization that the
"software management process" is unique entity, unlike hardware develop-
ment, and the current situation requires top level management attention.
Specific direction to improve the "process" is not provided, however, it can be
easily deduced that this document will provide the basis for corrective action
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within the DOD. It states, "...as evidenced by the information presented.. .the
overall responsibility for software management is clearly fragmented across
the DOD" [Ref. 25: A-i].
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a broad overview of the many complex factors
that a program manager must be aware of while managing a program involv-
ing software development. There must exist an awareness of the impacts of
philosophical, environmental, and quality issues. Addressing these issues
during the acquisition strategy formulation is a must.
The intent of this chapter is to show that even though the contracting
world seems somewhat rigid and inflexible, there are many approaches that
can be taken to improve software quality without having to change the con-
tracting process. The significance is an emphasis on a change of the software
development process, and not the contracting process.
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V. DATA COLLECTION RESULTS
A. DATA COLLECTION SURVEY
Having completed an extensive review of the literature available, the
next step was to see exactly how this "software development problem" is per-
ceived in the field. In addition to the personal interviews that were conducted,
a survey was forwarded to 150 management and contracting professionals
from both the government and industry. Of the 65 responses received, 49
reported having had experience in programs that involved the development
and acquisition of mission critical software. The average experience level of
the respondents was 9.5 years, ranging from 30 years of experience to one
year. A sample survey form is contained in Appendix A. Compiled survey
results are contained in Appendix B.
There was a overwhelming consensus that a problem does indeed exist
in the government's ability to procure custom designed software. The survey
responses indicated that each of the three areas, technical, contracting, and
program management equally shared the blame for the problems encoun-
tered. The following sections discuss each of the major survey areas.
B. PROBLEMS WITH SOFTWARE ACQUISITION
Respondents were asked to identify the percentage of software develop-
ment programs that resulted in cost overruns, schedule delays and poor
performance due to problems in one of three general areas: technical, contrac-
tual, managerial. Table VIII provides typical examp)es for each of the three
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TABLE VIII. Three Categories of Problems in Software Development
ABF.A EXAMELE
TECHNICAL Programming or interface difficulties
CONTRACTUAL Contract interpretation difficulties,
contract administration difficulties, or
possibly the use of an inappropriate
contract type.
MANAGERIAL Improper acquisition strategies, bad
business decisions, lack of attention,
lack of planning
problem categories. For the purposes of this particular question, the respon-
dents were also divided into three categories: technical personnel, contracting
personnel, and management personnel.
1. Technical Problems
The survey showed a perception exists that 59 percent of software
development programs suffered delays, cost overruns, and performance prob-
lems due to technical problems. Managers felt that 63.4 percent of the pro-
grams had technical problems, while the technicians themselves seemed to
think it was more like 56 percent. Contracting personnel were right at the 59
percent level.
2. Contracting Problems
Overall, the respondents felt that 46.5 percent of software develop-
ment programs suffered problems due to contracting issues. Technical and
contracting personnel agreed that 48 percent of the programs were affected
by contracting issues. Management, on the other hand, felt that only 42
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percent of the programs suffered delays, cost overruns, and performance prob-
lems due to contracting issues.
3. Program Management Problems
Managers blew the whistle on themselves. They felt that 61.2 per-
cent of the programs encountered problems due to "management related prob-
lems." The overall perception was 57.7 percent. Contracting personnel
believed that only 50 percent of the programs suffered problems due to man-
agement issues, while the technical folks felt it was almost 59 percent.
4. Summary
Based on the data collected in this section of the survey, there is a
perception that software development programs encounter delays, overruns,
and performance problems almost 60 percent of the time due to technical
issues, almost 58 percent of the time due to managerial, and less that 47 per-
cent of the time due to contracting issues. A complete listing of the responses
collected is contaiued in Appendix B.
C. TOP FIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS
The next section of the survey asked respondents to identify the five,
"...most common problems regarding contracting for and the management of
a program involving software development". Table IX is a list of alternatives
that were contained in the questionnaire. Answers were compiled using a
simple weighting system to rank the responses. The ranking system assigned
a weight of 10 points to the number one response, eight to number two, six to
number three, four to number four, and two points to the number five
response. The survey overwhelmingly showed that the respondents believed
that the government's inability to identify clear user requirements was the
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TABLE IX. Most Common Problem Areas in Software Development
Unclear user requirements Unclear statem.nt of work
Schedule too optimistic Contract clauses too restrictive
Lack of gov' regulations Too many govl regulations
Inadequate govl specifications Too many govl specifications
Lack of timely user feedback Lack of design reviews
Wrong personnel at design reviews Lack of hardware design freeze
Lack of software design freeze Inadequate testing (goVt)
Failure to designate POC's Inad-Auate testing (contractor)
Improper contract type Difficult acquisition procedures
Lack of qualified govl tech personnel Inherent inability to measure
Too many changes to requirements reliability of software
Inability to estimate cost Lack of contractor incentive
Lack of understanding regarding Lack of adequate documentation
software design and development Lack of configuration mgmt
Mismanagement by industry Mismanagement by gov't
Others
number one problem in software development. The top five answers, along
with their weightings are listed in Table X. A complete listing of all responses
can be found in Appendix B.
TABLE X. Five Most Common Problems in Software Development
RANKING PROBLEM TOTALPOINTS
1. UNCLEAR USER REQUIRE',,ENTS 252
2. TOO MANY CHANGES TO REQUIREMENTS 140
3. LACK OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING SOFTWARE
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 134
4. SCHEDULE TOO OPTIMISTIC 130
5. UNCLEAR STATEMENT OF WORK 92
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1. Unclear User Requirements
As for what the respondents felt was at the heart of the num-
ber one problem, impressions varied greatly. "Users tend to not know what
they want til they see it half done, then they are sure they want something
different", said one respondent. On the other end of the spectrum, another felt
that, "although the customer knows what he wants, he is unable to communi-
cate his needs to the contractor..." Mr. Ted Bosworth, Vice President for C3
Systems at Comptek Research in Buffalo, NY, summed up the problem by
saying, "The typically inaccurate initial translation between user and engi-
neering communities, and the years between initial statement of need and
completion of development, virtually assures that software 'forks' are deliv-
ered to provide users the ability to eat their 'soup"' [Ref. 48]. No matter what
the underlying reason, a lack of knowledge or a lack of communication, it
seems only logical that the government must develop a means to better
identify end u.cr requirements. Finally, one respondent stated, "Too many
times the wrong people are asked what is required. If we could produce a
rapid prototype to touch, feel and see maybe we would do a better job of it."
2. Too Many Changes to Requirements
Given that the government has problems identifying its require-
ments lends to the second problem area identified by survey respondents, "too
many changes to requirements." On this subject one respondent said, "It is
common to have several ECP's in work at several times all at different stages
of definition, design, development or incorporation. This leads to multiple
baselines which complicates... configuration management, schedules, esti-
mating, and program management by both industry and government."
Another expressed the difficulties with too many changes by making the
analogy of trying to "hit a moving target."
50
3. Lack of Understanding Regarding Software Design and
Development
Addressing this issue one respondent said:
We (Govt) are not careful enough in our monitoring of processes that
result in products/services. We traditionally have viewed (inspected)
the finished product... In the case of software, this lack of attention to
processes in design and development may fatally flaw the finished
product and yet the flaw may go undetected for months/years.
There seems to be a consensus among respondents whu chose this issue as
one of their top five. One respondent felt that, "...almost everyone THINKS
they understand software design and development and yet they do not com-
municate vwell with their counterparts in industry/government." Another
respondent felt that, "issues such as 'Design for Supportability' and compati-
bility or interoperability get confused with ownership and cost/profit issues."
It seems that this issue once again stresses the need for open lines of commu-
nication between the government and industry.
4. Schedule Too Optimistic
A survey respondent, a program manager in the private sector, who
listed this as his number one problem said, "Typically the government acqui-
sition process is so slow that it becomes mandatory to accelerate the devel-
opment process in order to meet user needs. The complexity of the task is not
re-scoped and this forces the contractor into attempting to achieve unrealistic
schedules." Mr. Ted Bosworth stated:
Every program I have been involved with that had significant software
content had a schedule that assumed the user community knew exactly
what they wanted; the Government development activity translated
operational requirements into a technical specification completely,
accurately, and without the possibility of misinterpretation by devel-
opment engineers, and the engineers made no mistakes. Unfortunately
for schedule performance, I have yet to see a set of humans that good.
[Ref. 48]
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5. Unclear Statement of Work
Many of these top five problems are interrelated. If the users fail to
identify their needs accurately, then how can the program office write an
adequate statement of work? One respondent stated, "Initial SOW's are what
drive proposals - not what becomes the end item other than as an overall
skeletal shell. The upgrading of the SOW is often not accomplished in a
timely manner: hence there is an attempt to maintain proposal schedules
which no longer reflect the realities." Another felt that, "many times the
Statement of Work details are not clearly detailed in writing and it easily
leads to misunderstandings on the part of the Contractor." On the other
hand, one respondent felt that, "an unclear statement of work isn't necessar-
ily all bad - especially with Full Scale Development programs... more
emphasis should be placed on what the contractor intends to do and how they
priced it." Still another respondent said, "...SOW's often have both too much
detail and not enough. Too much detail limits the creativity of the contractor,
and not enough results in a program that doesn't meet the need." In speaking
about the contents of a statement of work, one respondent said, "Too many
technical requirements are levied in lieu of user requirements, let the user
define the requirements not the engineers interpreting the user's
requirements."
D. CONTRACTING FOR SOFTWARE
1. Selection of a Contract Type
As discussed earlier in Chapter III, the selection of a contract type
is a discretionary decision of the contracting officer and program manager,
with some room for negotiation with the contractor. It is a decision that will
hopefully result in a win-win situation between the government and the
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contractor. Although many factors are involved in the decision process, the
major factor is usually a question of risk assumption. Typically development
programs, considered somewhat of a higher risk, would use some type of cost
reimbursement arrangement. The opposite holds true in a more stable envi-
ronment such as a follow-on or production effort where a fixed price arrange-
ment is typically used.
One of the early premises of this thesis was that contract type might
play a significant role in the eyes of the personnel involved in the procure-
ment of custom designed software. This was shown to be untrue. Only three
of the 49 respondents considered "improper contract type" as one of their top
five concerns in software development programs. One respondent summed up
this issuc by stating:
The contract type is not the key to success. A good contract is worth
crap if the admin is poor. A bad contract can be a success if adminis-
tered well. The problem is not the contract type it's how to make it
work to meet your need. (Anonymous)
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Contract Types
The two general categories of contract types that are available for
software development are cost reimbursement and fixed price. Each has its
advantages and disadvantages along with their appropriate uses.
It may be very appropriate to use a firm fixed-price contract for
easily and accurately estimated software efforts. The biggest advantage of a
firm fixed-price contract is there is very little administrative overhead. The
contractor assumes the technical, schedule and cost risk. Once the contract is
awarded the only concern becomes the deliverable product. On the other
hand, a firm fixed-price contract may be the most inappropriate contract to
use for software development, such as a new start weapons program.
This type of pricing arrangement offers almost no flexibility to either the
53
contractor or the government. In a development environment, this means that
the product is built to the specifications in the contract, period. If, as
discussed above, the users have problems communicating their needs, the
program office has problems interpreting their needs, and the engineers have
problems satisfying those needs, the government and the contractor are
locked into an agreement that isn't worth the paper its written on. The
contractor is not incentivized to seek new, innovative, and possibly more
efficient ways to satisfy software requirements. Likewise, the contractor has
little motivation to take the extra time required to document the software
other than the minimal requirements under the FFP agreement. This may
lead to tremendous maintenance troubles during the systems life cycle.
Contractors on a tight schedule and/or budget are less likely to restrict the
level of effort put in to systems development. Most corporations would be
very leery to sign a firm fixed price contract for those development programs
that contain, in a prudent businessman's judgment, too many uncertainties.
The other option available for a software development effort is a
cost reimbursement pricing arrangement. Under this arrangement, the con-
tractor is relieved of the cost risk associated with a development program.
The contractor has some flexibility as to how to satisfy the user's needs, and
is not locked in to the single approach selected at the onset of the program.
The major disadvantage lies in the fact that the contractor is entitled to all
allowable and allocable expenses incurred. This means that the program
office may have underestimated the task in terms of cost and time, resulting
in a need for additional funding. Cost reimbursement contracts, in compari-
son to fixed price arrangements, require a great deal of administrative
overhead.
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3. Recommendations from the Field
Survey respondents were asked to identify the contract types that
they had worked with during a software development effort. Responses
covered the entire spectrum of contract types, bar none, outlined in the FAR.
Survey respondents were then asked to identify the contract type that, "offers
the most benefit to both the government and the contractor during a software
development effort." A list of the recommended contract types is shown in
Table XI. Eighteen of the respondents felt that they could not give an answer
to the question. Most said that it was impossible to generalize, and the selec-
tion of contract type depended on the particular situation for each individual
program.
TABLE XI. Recommended Contract Types for Software Development
CONI PACT TYPE NO. OF RESPONSES





COST TYPE (UNSPECIFIED) 2
FIRM-FIXED-PRICE 2
4. Complicating the Issue
It is very unlikely that a contract for the development of embedded
mission critical software will be segregated from the hardware development
effort. The selection of contract type now becomes a question of which con-
tract will best suit the needs of the entire program.
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If an incentive type contract is selected, the government must now
decide just what to incentivize. Remember what was said about hardware
earlier, we can see and feel it. It is much easier to structure an incentive con-
tract around those things that can be seen and felt. This leaves a very diffi-
cult task for the contracting officer and program manager who attempt to
structure the incentive type contract around software, as well as, hardware
development measures.
It is not impossible to use incentive contracts for software develop-
ment. It does, however, require a great deal of administrative and manage-
ment effort. In an interview with Mr. James Swizewski, a contracting officer
from the Naval Regional Contracting Center in Philadelphia, the subject of
using a CPAF contract was discussed. He stated that, in fact, NRCC had used
a CPAF contract for software development. He did not feel, however, that the
contract was executed efficiently [Ref. 49]. Even though the contractual vehi-
cle was in place, the contractor was not incentivized appropriately. A major
draw back to the use of a CPAF contract is that the contractor will concen-
trate his efforts on those measures in the contract that will result in his
receiving the award fee. In other words, regardless of those areas that may
require special attention based on events during the contract performance,
attention will go to areas defined at contract award that result in the receipt
of the award fee. Contractors have been known to devote so much attention to
the award fee criteria that the rest of the program suffers. Another drawback
is the tremendous requirement for administrative and managerial overhead
on the part of the government. Mr. Bud Wasgatt, Division Head of the Navy's
Combat Systems Test and Analysis Department, Port Hueneme, CA, felt that
the use of a CPAF contract is viable, but that the award fee must be tied to
some software quality indicator [Ref. 50]. There lies the problem. Again, we
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are back at the point of trying to identify and define software performance
indicators.
E. INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
One of the tools available to the program office is the use of an Indepen-
dent Verification and Validation (IV&V) organization to monitor the software
development process. The V&V personnel are the government's counterparts
to the company's Software Quality Assurance (SQA) staff. Mr. Humphrey
best states the concept of IV&V:
... IV&V can and should capitalize on the existence of SQA. If SQA
is working effectively, IV&V need not duplicate its work, and if not,
IV&V must not try to replace it. Their role is to highlight this short-
coming and get it fixed. [Ref. 43: 151]
Duties of the IV&V staff include: design and coding analysis, approval of
tests and test procedures, and witnessing of tests and inspections. Mr.
Jimmie Carlisle, Atlantic Research Corporation, serves as the head of the
IV &V team for the Marine Corps at Litton Data Systems Division in Los
Angeles. Litton has developed and is currently producing the AN/TYQ-23,
Tactical Air Operations Module, for the Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force.
He feels that the money dedicated up front by the Marine Corps to place his
IV&V team in-plant will result in tremendous payback during the software
operational and maintenance life cycle. Mr. Carlisle also sees an expansion of
the role of IV&V in the future to include some types of independent testing.
[Ref. 51]
The Marine Corps' SQA representative at the Marine Corps Tactical
Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA), located at Camp Pendleton, CA, whole-
heartedly concurs. CWO-3 David Mrazik feels that it is absolutely essential
to dedicate resources during the development phase, independent of the
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developing activity, to ensure supportability and maintainability throughout
the software's life cycle. MCTSSA will assume software maintenance
responsibility for the AN/TYQ-23 and its some 3.7 million lines of code
(estimated) in 1992. [Ref. 52]
F. PERFORMANCE WARRANTIES
Another way that the government can insure itself, at least against
monetary impacts, is to negotiate a warranty as part of the development/
production contract. Most typically used in the case of hardware deliverables,
warranties protect against patent defects after government acceptance.
(Patent defects are defects which should have been found through normal
inspection.) Adding a slight twist to this concept, program offices are now
using warranties to protect against software defects. The AN/TYQ-23 is such
a program. A performance warranty is included in the contract stating that:
The TAGM Computer Programs which reside in the AN/AYK-14
or AN/UYK-44 Computer and the software/firmware embedded in the
various unit processors.. .shall be free of performance defects during
the period specified under PERFORMANCE WARRANTY PERIOD. A
performance defect is defined as a failure of the computer program or
embedded processor software/firmware which prevents or precludes
the successful performance of, or accomplishment of, a function or sub-
function as specified in the Development Specification... and the
Program Performance Specifications... [Ref. 53: H-30]
The Performance Warranty Period is later defined as a period of, "two years
commencing upon the acceptance of the First Article" [Ref. 53: H-31].
While the contract also includes the usual special provisions regarding
actions that result in the warranty being "null and void", and the administra-
tion of such a warranty is going to be a great management challenge; this
type of agreement is definitely a step in the right direction. [Ref. 54]
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G. LESSONS LEARNED
Here are a few quotes that have been extracted from respondents'
answers to the final two survey questions dealing with "lessons learned" and
"other concerns":
* Educate both the customer and the contractor, during post-award, if not
before, as to the real need for cooperation (and) understanding of the
requirements
• Count on failure if your contracting officer is timid. If the system is an
infantry system - make the PM infantry. If the system is for armor -
make the PM armor... Keep the computer wizards out of the way. The
systems they knuw wurk at the speed of light, but they don't.
* Don't sleep through the first six months assuming you can't get in much
trouble so fast.
0 Get it defined up front, what is wanted, when its wanted and how much.
* Close coordination between technical and contracting personnel during the
development phase to assure only necessary changes are made.
* 1. Analyze the contract specification and develop a requirements
document which identifies what you will implement for each require
ment in the contract.
2. Review your "Requirements Document" with the government so that
early in the contract they will know how you have interpreted their
requirements and how you intend to satisfy each one.
3. Identify and record all disagreements and resolve them immediately.
4. Then lay out a "doable" schedule and go to work.
Do not wait until a CDR to tell the customer what he will receive as a
product!
* Never assume that just because the government does not have technically
qualified personnel that the contractor's personnel are more qualified than
we are.
* Implement frequent and comprehensive in process reviews. Communi-
cations is the key.
• Management is illiterate when it comes to software. They will not admit it,
therefore, they ignore it.
1. Too much time spent studying
2. Too little time spent applying
3. Too much, "No, you can't do that"
4. Too little, "Tell me more"
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" Realistic time and cost budgets at the onset are essential for a successful
software development program
" Managing software development is a fine balance between strict configu-
ration management and control, and the freedom to let the designers be
innovative and be personally involved in their work.
* Software is voodoo to most people and it's easy to get suckered (or bulled)
into thinking you understand all the requirements of the technical commu-
nity.
" Contract on a level of effort basis until all parties agree with the baseline
requirements.
" An ill defined project cannot be monitored.
* It is very, very difficult to accurately estimate the cost and schedule for a
software project that is unprecedented. Therefore the need to prototype
difficult areas before awarding FSD contract.
* A customer who understands his requirement- in detail- and will assist in
working the problem is irreplaceable.
" Risk management is the key to successful development programs
* Bright, experienced people that communicate effectively on both the
Government and industry teams equals success. Drones on either side, or
lack of communications, ensures failure.
* Identify de ielopment problems early. Force contractor management that
meets intermAiate objectives and milestones. Documentation is the most
expensive segmer.t of the development.
* Well defined functional requirements are imperative. On-going design
review is critical. Good lines of communication between users, managers,
and contractors is critical.
* Software is not something to be afraid of and it certainly should not be
ignored. Many times software is ignored or played down due to sheer
ignorance.
H. SUMMARY
Survey respondents felt that nearly 60% of all software development
programs resulted in cost overruns, schedule delays and poor performance
due to management and/or technical issues. They felt that almost 47% of the
development programs suffered contractual problem. No matter where the
blame lies, it is clear that both government and industry personnel have the
perception that a problem exists in the government's ability to procure
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custom designed software for its weapon systems. There is definitely a
perceived, if not real, problem in the government's ability to procure
customed designed software. Although there was tremendous diversity in the
answers to questions asked during the data collection phase of this research,
one underlying fact consistently came through - the need for open lines of
communication.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
"IF YOU ALWAYS DO
WHAT YOU ALWAYS DID
YOU WILL ALWAYS GET
WHAT YOU ALWAYS GOT"
CROMWELL (CIRCA 1650)
"AND WE DO, WE DO!"
SURVEY RESPONDENT (1990)
A. CONCLUSIONS
The research conducted has indicated that a serious problem exists
within the Department of the Navy, and within the Department of Defense in
general, concerning the procurement of customed designed software to be
used within its weapon systems. The problem was first brought to the Gov-
ernment's attention in 1979 by the General Accounting Office in its report,
"Contracting for Computer Software Development-Serious Problems
Require Management Attention to Avoid Wasting Additional Millions." In
1987, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Software reported
much the same situation. Their report to the Secretary of Defense began:
Many previous studies have provided an abundance of valid
conclusions and detailed recommendations. Most remain unimple-
mented. If the military software problem is real, it is not perceived
as urgent. We do not attempt to prove that it is; we do recommend
how to attack it if one wants to. [Ref. 47]
Ten years after the original GAO report, the same issues regarding the
procurement of software were brought to the attention of Congress by
their own Committee on Science, Space and Technology of the House of
Representatives.
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As discussed earlier in Chapter II, the major Department of Defense
directives regarding weapon system acquisition do not recognize the critical
importance of software procurement. This importance, and even more so
reliance, on embedded software deserves special recognition in directives such
as DOD Directive 5000.1, Major and Non-major Defense Acquisition Pro-
grams, and DOD Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Program Proce-
dures. Embedded software, by the sheer volume of assets consumed in its
design, development and maintenance, warrants special attention from a
resource management stand-point. That management attention will occur
only when the major DOD weapon system acquisition directives specifically
address the unique requirements associated with software development. The
Department of Defense Software Master Plan is a giant step in the right
direction. More recognition must follow.
This research has indicated that this problem is recognized not only by
external audit agencies such as the General Accounting Office, and Congres-
sional committees, but also by the staff agencies within the Department of
Defense itself. More importantly, the problems with embedded software are
recognized by both the government and industry personnel who are charged
with its development, procurement, and maintenance. Three-fourths of the
engineers, contracting personnel, and managers who responded to this
research's survey, felt that at least one half of the software development pro-
grams resulted in cost overruns, schedule delay and poor performance due to
program management issues. They all recognized that software development
programs typically have, in addition to management problems, technical
and/or contractual problems. The top five most common problems identified
by survey respondents, (unclear user requirements, too many changes to
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requirements, lack of understanding regarding software design and develop-
ment, schedule too optimistic, and unclear statement of work), all point
directly at management issues vice problems in the technical or contracting
areas.
How can a program office expect to ultimately satisfy the end user's mis-
sion need when that critical gap between the user and the software engineer
is not bridged? This research has shown that, more than any other problem,
the ability to accurately and correctly identify the user's requirements is the
number one problem with software development today. There are, however,
current development practices that can aid in building that bridge, specifi-
cally, the use of rapid prototyping.
Unfortunately, it is not an easy problem to correct. The heart of the prob-
lem does not lie in the complex system used to procure software. In other
words, the answer to embedded software development is not in the contract-
ing mechanism itself. The problem is fostered by the attitude and manage-
ment decisions of the personnel within that procurement system. The answer
lies in changing the "attitude", not in changing the basic procurement system.
Our program managers and contracting officers must learn to make smart,
well-informed decisions regarding software development.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are a result of this research effort:
1. Use of Rapid Prototyping
All significant software development programs should be contractu-
ally structured to require the iterative process known as "rapid prototyping."
This process has become an accepted, and in most cases, the preferred
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method of development to ensure the ultimate satisfaction of the user's needs.
This may require a formal policy change.
Four of the top five areas of concern, identified by the survey
respondents, would easily have less of an impact on software development
programs if the use of "rapid prototyping" became the standard for develop-
ment. Defining the user's requirements would become an iterative process,
thus easing the pressure on the program manager and contracting officer to
interpret these requirements into contractual language at the onset of the
program. User involvement throughout the phases of development would be
assured. This would also ease the pressure of detailing a statement of work in
excruciating detail that contracting officers, managers, and engineers would
be forced to live with throughout the program. Shorter periods of perfor-
mance, through the use of intermediate milestones and user reviews, would
make schedule setting more realistic. Finally, the impact of "too many
changes to requirements" would be lessened because the intent of the proto-
typing effort would be to incrementally massage user requirements, taking
the appropriate action to resolve any misinterpretations. The use of level of
effort type contracts should be explored as a possible means to implement this
prototype development methodology.
2. Use On-site IV&V on all Significant Software Development
Efforts.
The use of independent technical and management teams to moni-
tor the contractor's processes and performance is not an inexpensive under-
taking. The benefits from budgeting resources at the front end of a program
to do such a task, however, is without a doubt a worthwhile investment. Two
requirements hold constant for all Independent Verification and Validation
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(IV&V) efforts. First, the program office must be willing to dedicate the
required assets to the IV&V team, basically in terms of appropriate staffing
for the assigned task. It is foolish to halfheartedly provide a quasi-IV&V
team. In the end, the program office may potentially find itself in twice as
much trouble. Secondly, the IV&V team must be competent to perform the
task. Probably the most obvious requirement, and at the same time, the
hardest to satisfy. There are no magical answers or formulas to assess the
competency of an IV&V team. This is made even more difficult because like
many service contracts there are no tangible deliverable items. A third
requirement which is almost a constant is the need for the V&V effort to be
collocated with the contractor. It is absolutely worth the time and money to
have an on-site validation and verification team that reports directly to the
program office. It is important that the program manager not get lulled into a
false sense of security by using an IV&V team. Remember, they are technical
people validating the technical approaches used by the contractor. Someone
must still ensure that the software will satisfy the user's requirements.
3. Negotiate Software Performance Warranties in
Development Contracts
Negotiating a performance warranty for embedded computer
resources may be somewhat difficult, at best. There are definitely cost versus
benefit trade-offs. The deliverable/operational software is only warranted
against defects as delineated in the contract. As discussed earlier, a standard
measurement of software quality is difficult to define. The contract may
therefore call for the contractor produced Product Performance Specification
(PPS) to be the basis for the warranty. In that case, the government is under
the gun to ensure that the PPS, in fact, satisfies the users requirements.
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Given the difficulties described above, it may still be in the best interest of
the government to negotiate/require warranties for embedded software. The
more common they become, the more contractors will be incentivized to
specifically deliver products without defects, and to generally improve the
overall quality of their software development process.
4. Education of Program Managers and Contracting Officers
This "attitude" regarding software development can only be
changed through an educational process. In line with the initiatives to man-
date educational requirements for contracting officers and program man-
agers, a look at courses in software development management would be
appropriate. The answer is not to make computer programmers contracting
officers and program managers. It goes without saying, however, to make
smart decisions management personnel must be somewhat literate with
regard to software development techniques, processes, and the alternatives
available. One way to aid in that literacy attainment is to establish specific,
easily accessible, educational courses for those personnel that will manage
and contract for software development.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What currently allowable contractual mechanisms can be
used to improve the Department of the Navy's success in the
procurement of custom developed software ?
As discussed in the conclusions and recommendations to this
research effort, the current procurement problems regarding customed
designed and developed software can all be addressed using management
action within the current contracting system. The use of prototyping would
require a re-thinking of the way we normally do business, but it is not only a
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viable option, it is becoming the most valid approach. Acquisition strategies
should call for the use of an on-site IV&V team from either dedicated in-house
resources or procured from the private sector though a service type contract.
The prime contractor, in this case must be made aware of the IV&V's rela-
tionship to the program manager and contracting officer, and the extent of
their authority. The last contractual mechanism that should be seriously con-
sidered is the use of a performance warranty to both protect the government
and incentivize the contractor.
While use of contracting mechanisms was the basic premise of this
research effort, it became obvious that the problems encountered in the pro-
curement of embedded computer resources was not a contracting issue.
2. How successful is the Department of Defense/Department of
the Navy in the procurement of custom software?
Even based on the broad definition of program success given in
Chapter I, this question remains difficult to answer. It is relatively easy to
find program information for those programs that have suffered setbacks.
The issue gains attention because of the nature of software development. It is
manpower intensive, extremely costly, and delivers no tangible product.
When setbacks are in terms of billions of dollars in overruns, years of slip-
page in schedules, and deliver of software that is not safe for use, the crisis
seems phenomenal. Unfortunately, those development programs that are
delivered on time, on budget, and that work, or suffer only minimal problems
are not deemed news worthy in these times of public mistrust of government
procurement. Successful programs do not get adequate recognition regardless
of the product being developed.
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3. What directives regulate and/or guide Program Managers
and Contracting Officers in the procurement of custom
software ?
The Brooks Bill (PL89-306) of 1965, and the Warner Amendment to
the Fiscal Year 1982 Appropriations Act (PL 97-86), are the two specific laws
that pertain to software procurement. They mandate a clear set of directions
regarding the procurement of computer hardware and software for adminis-
trative type functions and military missions, respectively. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) do not specifically recognize the procurement of
software as being different from the procurement of any other good or service.
The DOD FAR Supplement only provides guidance as far as recapitulating
what type software procurement is allowable directly by the DOD under the
Warner Amendment.
Within the Department of the Defense/Department of the Navy
there are three major directives that provide guidance regarding the pro-
curement and management of embedded computer resources. They are: DOD
Directive 5000.29, Management of Computer Resources in Major Defense
Systems; SECNAVINST 5200.32, Management of ECR in Department of the
Navy Systems; and, MCO 5200.23A, Management of Mission-Critical Com-
puter Resources (MCCR) in the Marine Corps. Numerous other orders and
directives pertaining to specific areas of a system acquisition such as test and
evaluation, configuration management, and standardization are also applica-
ble to embedded computer resource development and procurement.
There are two military standards that provide the majority of
the specific direction to the program manager and contracting officer. The
first, DOD-STD-2167A, Defense System Software Development, delineates
the requirements for mission critical software development. The second,
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DOD-STD-2168, Defense System Software Quality Program, establishes the
requirements for a contractor's software quality assurance program. These
two standards are designed to be used in conjunction with each other.
4. What contract types are typically used for programs
involving the development of custom software ?
There is no one contract type can be identified as "typically used"
for software development. More importantly, there is no one contract type
that can be identified as being the best for software development. The full
spectrum of contract types, from Firm-Fixed-Price to Cost-Plus-Award-Fee
contracts, were reported as having been used by the survey respondents. The
research showed that every type contract has the potential for being used,
and that the selection is totally dependent upon the situation.
5. Are there any contractual mechanisms that can be used to
aid in the development of custom software ?
The provisions of DOD Standards 2167A and 2168 when called out
in a contract are probably the best contractual direction that we can provide a
contractor during a software development program. The use of JV&V teams
and performance warranties will help to ensure the contractor is number one
doing his job, and number two, willing to back the quality of his work. Most of
the other influences pertaining to software development contract are man-
agerial in nature. In other words, the government needs program managers
and contracting officers who can make good business decisions while satisfy-
ing the user's mission requirements.
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Formal Software Development Education
Examine the existing management schools within the Department
of Defense to evaluate the content and the adequacy of courses offered dealing
with the management and procurement of custom developed software. This
research effort indicated that the root of the software development problem is
not in the procurement system itself, but in the personnel within the system.
As the dependence on software continues to grow, the ability of government
procurement personnel to understand the nature of design and development
of mission critical software will become increasingly more critical.
2. Use of "Rapid Prototyping' in Software Development
Examine various means to implement "rapid prototyping" as a
standard development process for mission critical computer resources. This
would involve an investigation of various contracting strategies that would
support the use of software prototyping in development programs for weapon
systems. As discussed above, the use of prototyping would go a long way in
helping to resolve four of the five top software development issues identified
in this research. In conjunction with the examination of contracting tech-
niques, a review of existing policies dealing with the use of prototyping as an
acquisition strategy should be undertaken. It may be useful to examine any
programs that have used prototyping techniques for embedded software
development, and develop a model program for software procurement based
on this approach.
3. Use of Level of Effort Contracts in Software Development
Examine the use of level of effort type contracts for software devel-
opment. In line with the recommendation above, one way of emulating a
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prototype approach is to use progressive level of effort contracts, and/or
competitive level of effort contracts. The Fleet Combat Direction System
Support Activity at Dam Neck, VA, is doing just that. This research effort
would include an enalysis of their procedures for procuring custom software
in the development phase, the production phase, and life cycle maintenance
phase for a weapon system. [Ref. 55]
4. Software Performance Warranties
Examine the value of software performance warranties in weapons
systems development and procurement contracts. Although the AN/TYQ-23,
Tactical Air Operations Module, production contract has provisions that call
out a two year software performance warranty, the system has yet to be
fielded. The warranty is based on the system's compliance with the software
Product Performance Specification. Looking back to Figure 4.3, one can see
the relative cost )f software changes that would be required to correct defi-
ciencies. Therefore, one can easily deduce that the implementation of the
warranty clause will be difficult, at best. Questions such as: in scope/out-of-
scope?; system operated in accordance with operating manuals?; proper doc-
umentation of defects, and ability to recreate the defect?; will be negotiated
well beyond the warranty period. This recommended research would analyze
the effectiveness of those systems acquisition contracts that contain software
performance warranties. Another approach would be to produce a model or a
checklist for use as a guide when negotiating software warranties.
5. Model for a Weapon System Incentive Contract
Develop a model incentive type contract that can be tailored and
used for weapon system procurement involving both hardware and software
development. During the acquisition strategy formulation stages, it would be
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extremely helpful to have a straw-man or model incentive contract to aid in
the structuring of the contractual mechanism that would focus both hardware
and software criteria. The ability and practicality of segregating software
from hardware criteria would need to be investigated. The practicality and
economics of using, for example, an award fee contract with incentives for
software, as well as, hardware accomplishments would require analysis. This
type approach would accomplish two valuable objectives. First, the contractor
would be monetarily incentivized to place more attention on those software
criteria deemed critical by the program office. Second, the program office
would be forced (by the contractor seeking his monetary award) to pay closer
attention to software development issues. This effort could also investigate
the establishment of a model for the award criteria itself. In other words, it
would research current software measures of effectiveness that could be




CONTRACTING FOR CUSTOM DEVELOPED SOFTWARE WITHIN DOD
1. What is your most recent job experience?
A. Government Industry
B. Program Manager Program Engineer
Contracting Officer (PCO) __ DCAS QA Rep
Contract Administrator Tech Rep
Project Officer Other
(specify)
2. Have you been involved in a program that required the development of custom software (i.e., major
weapon system) for the Department of Defense?
Yes No If YES please CONTINUE-If NO, STOP and kindly return the survey.
3. How many years experience do you have with acquisition programs requiring custom software?
4. Where would you say that Lhe majority of your expertise lies?
Program Manager Program Engineer
Contracting Officer (PCO) _ . DCAS QA Rep
Contract Administrator Tech Rep
Project Officer Other
(specify)
The following three questions deal with problems regarding computer software within a comolex weapon
system. For each question, place an 'x' along the corresponding scale.
5. Do technical developmental oroblems (i.e., programming/interface difficulies) lead to cost overruns,
schedule delays and poor performance?I I I I I
100% 75% 50% 25% 0%
Almost Always Sometimes Very Rarely
6. Do contracting related oroblems lead to cost overruns, schedule delays and poor performance?I I I I I
100% 75% 50% 25% 0%
Almost Always Sometimes Very Rarely
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7. Do orogram management related oroblems lead to cost overruns, schedule delays and poor
performance?I I IiI
100% 75% 50% 25% 0%
Almost Always Sometimes Very Rarely
8. Please rank the FIVE (1 thru 5) most common problems regarding contracting for and the manage-
ment of a program invoking software development (with I being the most common problem)
Unclear user requirements Unclear Statement of Work
Schedule too optimistic Contract clauses too restrictive
Lack of gov't regulations Too many govt regulations
Inadequate govi specifications Too many govt specifications
Lack of timely user feedback Lack of design reviews
Wrong personnel at design reviews Lack of hardware design freeze
Lack of software design freeze Inadequate testing (gov't)
Failure to designate POCs Inadequate testing (contractor)
Improper contract type Difficult acquisition procedures
Lack of qualified govt tech personnel - Inherent inability to measure
Too many changes to requirements reliability of software
Inability to estimate cost Lack of contractor incentive
Lack of understanding regarding Lack of adequate documentation
software design & development - Lack of configuration mgmt
Mismanagement by Industry Mismanagement by govt
Others
IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED FOR ANY OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS- PLEASE ATTACH
A SEPARATE SHEEI OF PAPER. HAND WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS ARE FINE.






10. What do you feel is the most important ingredient to the success of a software development phase in
a major weapon system procurement from a contracting aspet?
11. What do you feel is the most important ingredient to the success of a software development phase in
a major weapon system procurement from a manaoement asoect?
12. What type contracts have you worked with on software development programs?
Firm Fixed Price __ Fixed Price Incentive __ Cost Plus Fixed Fee__ Cost Plus Award Fee__
Other
13. Have you experienced any particular benefits or drawbacks associated with any of the contract types
mentioned in question 12 above?
14. What contract type do you feel offers the most benefit to both the government and the contractor
during a software development effort'
76
15. What is the most important lesson you have learned (from either a good or bad experience) in dealing
with a contract that requires software development?
16. Do you have any otheor concerns regarding the procurement of custom developed software?




GO INOVT R POSITION yM ELH CONTRACT MGMT
1 X SOA SUPERVISOR 4 80 50 50
2 X CONTRACT ADMIN 2 70 25 35
3 X GOV'T CONTRACTS MGR 10 20 70 85
4 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 3 80 60 60
5 X CONTRACT ADMIN 5 50 50 50
6 X CONTRACT ADMIN 8 100 75 25
7 X P0O 8 45 15 55
8 X PROGRAM MANAGER 30 80 65 50
9 X TEST MGR 3 80 80 50
10 X CONTRACT ADMIN 5 85 70 50
11 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 8 50 25 65
12 X PCO 4 75 70 50
13 X TEST DIRECTOR 8 75 20 70
14 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 22 20 20 20
15 X PROGRAM MANAGER 22 90 65 90
16 X DCASPRO ENGINEER 5 20 15 15
17 X COMPUTER ENGINEER 15 70 85 55
18 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 2 70 65 65
19 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 7 80 80 35
20 X TECHNICAL REP 10 100 65 90
21 X DCAS (DCMR) ENGINEER 10 50 65 50
22 X CONTRACT ADMIN 8 35 50 75
23 X SQA 13 60 50 75
24 X SQA 7 75 70 85
25 X PROGRAM MANAGER 7 30 20 40
26 X PROGRAM MANAGER 25 75 25 45
27 X CONTRACT ADMIN 3 45 60 65
28 X TECHNICAL REP 10 75 50 65
29 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 13 75 75 75
30 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 5 45 90 80
31 X QA REP 10 40 20 45
32 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 20 50 35 75
33 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 23 15 25 10
34 X PROGRAM MANAGER 12 80 50 75
35 X V.P. C3 SYSTEMS 20 40 70 70
36 X PROGRAM MANAGER 7 75 25 50
37 X PROJECT OFFICER 3 75 50 100
38 X SYS ANALYST 2 75 20 65
39 X PROJECT OFFICER 1 50 25 25
40 X SOFTWARE ENGINEER 4 65 70 60
41 X PROJECT OFFICER 4 80 50 50
42 X COTR 4 75 25 25
43 X PROGRAM MANAGER 10 50 20 75
44 X QA REP 17 20 0 90
45 X PROGRAM MANAGER 8 25 40 50
46 X PROGRAM MANAGER 10 30 25 60
47 X CONTRACT OFFICER 14 50 20 40
48 X COMPUTER ENGINEER 12 20 40 65
49 X PROJECT OFFICER 5 80 45 80
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TECHNICAL
NGOV INDUSTRY POSITION TECQH CONTRACT MG CONTRACT
15 X COMPUTER ENGINEER 70 85 55
12 X COMPUTER ENGINEER 20 40 65 CPAF
10 X DCAS (DCMR) ENGINEER 50 65 50 CPFF
5 X DCASPRO ENGINEER 20 15 15 CPAF
23 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 15 25 10
22 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 20 20 20
20 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 50 35 75 CPFF
13 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 75 75 75
8 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 50 25 65
7 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 80 80 35 CPAF
5 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 45 90 80
3 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 80 60 60
2 X PROGRAM ENGINEER 70 65 65 FPI
17 X QAREP 20 0 90
10 X QA REP 40 20 45 FPI
4 X SOFTWARE ENGINEER 65 70 60 CPAF
13 X SQA 60 50 75 FPI
7 X SQA 75 70 85
4 X SQA SUPERVISOR 80 50 50 CPFF
2 X SYS ANALYST 75 20 65 FFP
10 X TECHNICAL REP 100 65 90 FPI
10 X TECHNICAL REP 15 50 65
10.1 AVERAGES 56.14 48.9 58.9
CONTRACTING
N.GOr INDUSTRY POSITION TECH CONTRAT MGMT CONTRACT
8 X CONTRACT ADMIN 100 75 25 CPIF
8 X CONTRACT ADMIN 35 50 75
5 X CONTRACT ADMIN 85 70 50 FPI
5 X CONTRACT ADMIN 50 50 50
3 X CONTRACT ADMIN 45 60 65 CPAF
2 X CONTRACT ADMIN 70 25 35 COST PLUS
14 X CONTRACT OFFICER 50 20 40
4 X COTR 75 25 25 CPAF
10 X GOVT CONTRACTS MGI 20 70 85 CPAF
8 X PCO 45 15 55 COST TYPE
4 x PCO 75 70 50
6.45 AVERAGES 59.09 48.18 50.46
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MANAGEMENT
Nh. noV- INDUSTRY POSITION TECH CONTRACT MGMT CONTRtACT
15 X COMPUTER ENGINEER 70 85 55
30 X PROGRAM MANAGER 80 65 50 CPFF
25 X PROGRAM MANAGER 75 25 45 CPIF
22 X PROGRAM MANAGER 90 65 90
12 X PROGRAM MANAGER 80 50 75 CPIF
10 X PROGRAM MANAGER 50 20 75
10 X PROGRAM MANAGER 30 25 60
8 X PROGRAM MANAGER 25 40 50 CPAF
7 X PROGRAM MANAGER 75 25 50 CPFF
7 X PROGRAM MANAGER 30 20 40 FPI
5 X PROJECT OFFICER 80 45 80 FPI
4 X PROJECT OFFICER 80 50 50 CPAF
3 X PROJECT OFFICER 75 50 100 FFP
1 X PROJECT OFFICER 50 25 25
8 X TEST DIRECTOR 75 20 70 FPI
3 X TEST MGR 80 80 50 CPFF
-20 40 70 70
10.9 AVERAGES 63.44 42.19 61.25
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PERCENTAGE OF SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
THAT SUFFER PROBLEMS AS A RESULT OF TECHNICAL,
CONTRACT, OR MANAGEMENT ISSUES
PERCENTAGE OF PROGRAMS
RESPONDENT IEG8WIAL CONTRACT MAEMENT
DCAS SQA 80 50 50
COMMANDER DCASPRO 70 30 40
PROCUREMENT MANAGER 20 70 85
PROGRAM ENGINEER 80 60 60
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATOR 50 50 50
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATOR 100 75 25
CONTRACTING OFFICER 50 10 55
PROGRAM ENGINEER 80 65 50
TEST DIRECTOR/MANAGER 85 80 50
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATOR 85 70 50
SYSTEMS ENGINEER 50 25 70
COMMANDER DCASPRO 75 70 55
TEST DIRECTOR 75 20 70
NAVPRO ENGINEER 35 50 75
DCAS ENGINEER 50 65 50
PROGRAM MANAGER 30 20 45
PROGRAM MANAGER 75 25 40
COMPUTER ENGINEER 65 85 55
PROGRAM ENGINEER 70 65 65
PROGRAM EhJGINEER 80 80 35
PROGRAM MANAGER 90 65 90
CONTRACT MANAGER 45 65 60
V.P. C31 SYSTEMS 40 75 75
TECH REP 75 50 70
PROGRAM ENGINEER 75 75 75
PROGRAM ENGINEER 45 85 80
QA REP 40 20 45
PROGRAM ENGINEER 20 20 20
PROGRAM ENGINEER 50 40 75
PROGRAM ENGINEER 15 25 5
PROGRAM ENGINEER 85 50 75
DCASPRO ENGINEER 15 15 15
PROGRAM MANAGER 50 35 75
PROJECT OFFICER 50 25 25
PROGRAM MANAGER 75 20 65
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATOR 75 50 50
PROGRAM MANAGER 75 25 50
PROJECT OFFICER 75 50 100
AVERAGE 61.83 49.88 57.80
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MOST COMMON PROBLEM IN WT.
RANKING SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE
1 Unclear user requirements 252.0
2 Too many changes to requirements 140.0
3 Lack of understanding regarding software design 134.0
4 Schedule too optimistic 130.0
5 Unclear statement of work 92.0
6 Lack of qualified gov't tech personnel 88.0
7 Inadequate goVt specifications 76.0
8 Lack of software design freeze 66.0
9 Inability to estimate cost 54.0
10 Lack of adequate documentation 46.0
11 Mismanagement by the government 40.0
12 Difficult acquisition procedures 36.0
13 Inadequate testing (contractor) 28.0
14 Mismanagement by Industry 28.0
15 Lack of timely user feedback 26.0
16 Lack of configuration ngmt 26.0
17 Lack of contractor incentive 26.0
18 Lack of hardware design freeze 24.0
19 Wrong personnel at design reviews 24.0
20 Too many govi regulations 24.0
21 Improper contract type 16.0
22 Inability to measure reliability of software 16.0
23 Too many govi specifications 12.0
24 Contract clauses too restrictive 10.0
25 System Engineering failures 10.0
26 Inadequate source selection 10.0
27 Inadequate testing (govi) 6.0
28 Lack of design reviews 4.0
29 Failure to designate POCs 2.0
30 Inability to measure software maintainability 2.0
31 Lack of gov't regulations 0.0
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APPENDIX C
LIST OF PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED
1. Carlisle, Jimmie. Technical Manager, Defense Systems Division,
Atlantic Research Corporation, Van Nuys, California, Interview, April
1990.
2. Bosworth, Ted. Vice President for C3 Systems, COMPUTEK Research
Inc., Buffalo, New York, Interview, May 1990.
3. Firestone, David. Acquisition Engineer, AN/TYQ-23 Tactical Air Opera-
tions Module, Space and Naval Warfare Command, Washington, D.C.,
Interview, March 1990.
4. Mrazik, David R. CWO-3 USMC. Software Quality Assurance Officer,
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, Camp Pendleton, Cali-
fornia, Interview, April 1990.
5. Primm, Ed. Fleet Combat Direction System Support Activity, Dam
Neck, Virginia, Interview, May 1990.
6. Quattlebaum, John R. Lt Col USMC. Deputy Program Manager,
AN/TYQ-23 Tactical Air Operations Module, Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command, Washington, D.C., Interviews, January and March
1990.
7. Swizewski, James. Contracting Officer, Naval Regional Contracting Cen-
ter, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Interview, March 1990.
8. Thomas, Bruce J. Major USMC. Naval Electronic Systems Command
Technical Representative, Litton Data Systems, Van Nuys, California,
Interview, April 1990.
9. Wasgatt, Bud. Division Head, Combat Systems Test and Analysis
Department, Naval Ship Weapon Systems Engineering Station, Port
Hueneme, California, Inteview, April 1990.
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